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Estates and Trusts Article and the paternity statutes, was intended to provide a
mechanism to assure that children born
out of wedlock after their putative
father's death may obtain a judicial determination of their paternity for purposes of establishing inheritance and
other rights. [d. at 481,578 A.2d at 766.
Thus, the court concluded that the circuit court was empowered under the
paternity statute to declare whether
Brown was the father of Leah, despite
the fact that he had died before the
paternity action was filed and without
regard to whether an award of child
support could be made against his estate.
Id. at 482, 578 A.2d at 766. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit
court's judgment and remanded the
case with directions to conduct further
proceedings to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether
Brown was Leah's father. Id.
Thus, the court significantly expanded
Maryland's paternity laws, as children
born out of wedlock may now obtain a
declaration of paternity even if the
alleged father's death occurred prior to
the petition. While the number of fraudulent paternity claims may increase, this
concern, as the court noted, does not
outweigh the legitimate purpose of promoting the general welfare and best
interests of illegitimate children through
their right to establish paternity.
- Steven Vinick
Jones v. Speed: EACH APPOINTME NT AT WHICH A PHYSICIAN
NEGUGENTLY FAILS TO
CORRECTLY DIAGNOSE HIS
PATIENT MAY CONSTITUTE A
SEPARATE NEGUGENT ACT
UNDER MARYLAND'S MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF
UMITATIONS.
In the recent decision of jones v.
speed, 320Md. 249, 577 A.2d64 (1990),
the court of appeals ruled that Maryland's five year statute of limitations
does not prevent a patient from bringing
a medical malpractice claim against her
negligent physician in spite of the fact
that the initial misdiagnosis occurred
more .than five years before bringing
suit.
In July of 1978, Elizabeth Jones consulted Dr. William Speed about her
severe headaches. Although Mrs. Jones

expressed concern that the headaches
may have been caused by an intracranial
abnormality, the doctor did not perform
a Computerized Axial Tomography
study ( CAT scan) or other diagnostic
studies. Mrs. Jones continued to see Dr.
Speed until September 16, 1985. During
this period she made sixteen visits to the
doctor, but Dr. Speed never ordered
diagnostic studies of any kind despite
her persistent headaches. On February
13, 1986 she suffered a nocturnal seizure. A neurologist ordered a CAT scan,
noted a brain tumor and had it surgically
removed. Since then, she has been free
of headaches and related symptoms. On
July 14, 1986, the Joneses filed suit
against Dr. Speed for failure to diagnose
the tumor despite his seven years of
treatment.ld. at 254, 577 A.2d at 66.
Mr. and Mrs. Jones first filed their
claim against Dr. Speed with the Health
Claims Arbitration Panel.!d. at 252, 577
A.2d at 65. Dr. Speed moved for summary judgment claiming that even if he
had been negligent in failing to diagnose
Mrs. Jones' brain tumor, the injury occurred upon the plaintiff's first visit to
him on July 17, 1978, more than eight
years before the complaint was filed. As
such, her claim was barred by section
5-109(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code
which requires that an action be brought
within "'[fjive years of the time the
injury was committed,'" or three years
from the date which the injury was discovered. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code
Ann. section 5-109(a)(I), (2) (1989).
Finding that the injury occurred on
July 17, 1978, the Chairman of the
Health Claims Arbitration Panel granted
the doctor's motion. jones, 320 Md. at
252,577 A.2d at 65. The Joneses filed a
notice of rejection of the Chairman's
order and filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Agreeing
that the claim was barred by the statute
of limitations, the circuit court also
granted Dr. Speed's motion for summary
judgment. On appeal, the Court ofAppeals
of Maryland granted certiorari before
the court of special appeals heard the
case.ld. at 253, 577 A.2d at 65-66.
In their complaint, the Joneses alleged
in their first count that Dr. Speed was
negligent when Mrs. Jones first visited
him and he failed to order tests which
would detect her brain tumor. The fol-

lowing counts incorporated the first by
reference but also stated that similar
acts of negligence occurred on each of
Mrs. Jones' subsequent visits. The final
count was a joint claim for loss of consortium.ld. at 252-53, 577 A.2d at 65.
According to theJoneses, each time that
the defendant examined Mrs. Jones and
failed to order tests which would have
revealed the tumor, a separate act of
negligence with its own injury occurred.
Thus, because many of the appointments
took place within five years of filing the
complaint, they constituted negligent
acts committed within the statute of
limitations.ld. at 255-56,577 A.2d at 67.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
agreed with the Jones' reasoning and
held that §5-109(a) did not bar their
medical malpractice claim by reason of
the statute of limitations. However, the
court cautioned that on remand they
must prove that the defendant committed a separate act of negligence within
that five year time frame. Mere proof
that she continued to suffer because of
an earlier negligent act would not be
enough.ld. at 261, 577 A.2d at 70.
Dr. Speed advanced several attacks
which failed to undermine the Jones'
argument. He claimed that accepting
the plaintiffs' rationale would breath life
into the "continuous course of treatment rule." [d. at 256, 577 A.2d at 67.
That rule, the court noted, tolled the
statute of limitations by delaying the
accrual date of undiscoverable medical
malpractice until the termination of
medical treatment. The rule had been
explicitly rejected in Hill v. Fitzgerald,
304 Md. 689, 501 A.2d 27 (1985).
Under that rule, Mrs. Jones would not
have been barred from suing as to her
first appointment because the treatment
of her headaches continued to well
within five years of her bringing her suit.
However, under the court's decision,
she was only permitted to bring suit as
to any negligence committed within five
years of her complaint, making clear that
the "continuous course of treatment
rule" remained dead. jones, 320 Md. at
256-57, 577 A.2d at 67.
The court also rejected Dr. Speed's
assertion that accepting the Jones' theorywould "frustrate the legislative intent
to provide absolute protection to health
care providers for acts of negligence
occurring more than five years before
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the bringing of an action." Id. at 257,
577 A.2d at 68. The court explained that
the Joneses could only succeed in their
suit if they could prove that Dr. Speed
had been negligent within the five years
prior to filing the complaint. Thus, the
, doctor could not be held liable for any
negligence occurring before that period
and, as such, he was protected to the
extent that the legislature intended
under §5-109. Id. at 257, 577 A.2d at 68.
Finally, Dr. Speed argued that the
long-standing prohibition against splitting a cause of action prevented the
Joneses from bringing suit. He argued
that had they brought suit for the initial
act of negligence occurring on July 17,
1978, their claim for relief would have
necessarily included damages resulting
from all subsequent negligent acts when
her tumor remained undiscovered. Thus,
because the Joneses were precluded
from bringing suit on the initial negligence and the initial negligence was so
intertwined with the later negligence,
to allow the Joneses to proceed on the
later counts was the same as permitting
them to split their cause of action. Id. at
257-58, 577 A.2d at 68.
The court agreed that splitting a cause
of action is prohibited in order "to prevent multiplicity of litigation and to
avoid the vexation, costs and expenses
incident to more than one suit on the
same cause of action." Ex Parte Carlin,
212 Md. 526, 532-33, 129 A.2d 827
(1957) quoted injones, 320 Md. at 258,
577 A.2d at 68 (1990). The flaw with
Speed's reasoning, noted the court, was
that the rules prohibiting splitting a
cause of action, and application of res
judicata principles only apply to situations where the plaintiff has in fact
brought suit and a final adjudication has
occurred. jones, 320 Md. at 259, 577
A.2d at 69. In the Jones' situation the
court explained that prior adjudication
addressing the physician's negligence
had never occurred. As such, the court
concluded, the Joneses were not precluded from bringing suit as to any acts
of negligence occurring within five years
of filing their complaint. Id.
Throughjones v. speed, 320 Md. 249,
577 A.2d 64 (1990), the Court of Appeals of Maryland has clarified what
constitutes a separate cause of action for
negligence and thereby starts the accrual
of Maryland's statute of limitations for

medical malpractice. Where a physician
repeatedly misdiagnoses his patient's
condition due to negligence, each visit
with the doctor may constitute a separate cause of action and thus, begin a new
statute of limitations.
- Michael P. CasEry

In re Billman: DISPOSITION OF
SUBSTITUTE ASSETS
POSSESSED BY THIRD PARTY
AND SUBJECT TO RICO
FORFEITURE MAY BE ENJOINED
In a case of first impression, the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled that it was within
the power of the district court to enjoin
the disposition of substitute assets pending criminal trial or forfeiture under
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations laws (RICO). The court held
that the statute, codified at 18 U.S.c.
1963, prohibited a defendant from avoiding forfeiture of his substitute assets. As
a result, transfer of a RICO target's assets
to a third person who did not qualify as a
bona fide purchaser for value did not
place the assets beyond the court's
jurisdiction. u.s. v. McKinnEry, 915 F.2d
916 (4th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit
determined that Congress intended Section 1963 to be construed liberally in
order to effectuate its remedial purpose.
The purpose, in the context of McKinnEry, was to preserve the defendant's
substitute assets for ultimate forfeiture
upon conviction.
Tom). Billman, implicated in the failure of a savings and loan, was indicted
for racketeering, fraud, and conspiracy
to commit mail and wire fraud. Before
the indictment was issued, however, Billman became a fugitive. After Billman's
flight, Barbara A. McKinney, an alleged
co-conspirator, received a number of
cryptic telephone calls from Billman's
London attorney and from Billman himself. The purpose of these conversations
was to arrange a wire transfer of approximately $500,000 from the attorney to
McKinney. In addition, McKinney agreed
to accept $50,000 from William C.
McKnew in order to discharge a debt
that McKnewowed to Billman. The debt
was listed among Billman's assets.
At the commencement of the action,
the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland entered a tempo-

rary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting McKinney from disposing of the
$550,000. McKinnEry, 915 F.2d at 919.
The court subsequently held a hearing
to determine the validity of the TRO,
and to rule on a motion by the United
States requesting an injunction restraining disposition of the funds pending the
forfeiture proceedings. Id.
The district court vacated the TRO
and denied the government's motion for
an injunction, reasoning that section
1963 makes only those assets which the
government proves are connected to
the fugitive's alleged racketeering activity subject to pretrial restraint. Id. The
court's decision was based on the government's inability to trace $22,000,000
deposited by the conspirators in Swiss
bank accounts to the assets held by
McKinney. Specifically, the lower court
ruled that the government had failed to
prove that the funds in question were
actual RICO proceeds, and further determined that after the wire transfer, the
funds belonged to McKinney. Id.
Believing that a more liberal reading
of the statute was appropriate, the court
of appeals held that an injunction should
have been issued. Id. at 919-20. Compelled to follow the lower court's findings of fact the court treated the questioned funds as legitimate, despite its
own opinion to the contrary. Id. at 920.
Noting that under RICO the money was
still subject to forfeiture as substitute
assets, the court held that an injunction
was proper against a third party who did
not qualify as a bona fide purchaser for
value. Thus, by determining that McKinney was not a bona fide purchaser, the
court held that the TRO was proper. Id.
at 921.
In its analysis of § 1963 (a)( 1) and
(3), the court recognized that a forfeiture proceeding against funds derived
from RICO criminal activity is "an in
personam proceeding against the defendant, and the forfeiture constitutes partial punishment of the offense." McKinnEry, 915 F.2d at 920.
Furthermore, amended section 1963
( m ) provides for the forfeiture of substitute assets when actual RICO proceeds
are unavailable. Subsection (m) specifically provides that "[iJfanyofthe property described in subsection (a), as a
result of any act or omission of the
defendant ... (3) has been placed be-
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